1980 MGM Fire and Fire Codes Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

1980 MGM fervor and Fire Codes - Case Study ExampleFig.1 shows the site plan of the hotel. It had 26 floors intentional luxuriously. Ground floor had the Casino, restaurants, showrooms and a convention center and upper level of the jai alai fronton. The below grade level had the lower level of the jai alai fronton, a movie theatre, several(prenominal) shops and b step forwardiques, service areas, and underground parking. in that respect were 2076 guest rooms and an separate 780 guest rooms under construction on the west side of the building. Hotel structure had fire-resistive, protected non-combustible and unprotected non-combustible segments. Both combustible and non-combustible materials were used for interior finish. Fire sprinklers were installed only in some major portions and every area was not protected for fire. function of the 26th floor, the arcade level, convention areas, showrooms and some restaurants on the casino level were protected while the casino and tower were not protected with fire sprinklers. A manual fire alarm system was present in the hotel. The guest room floors had manual pull stations. The alarm system had bells and public address capability. There was no automatic detection system installed in the building (National Fire Protection Association, 1980).... Security tried to put off the fire but it was so huge that the Clark County fire department had to be contacted at around 7.15 a.m. (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Fig.2 and Fig. 3 shows the fire magnitude at MGM Grand. Fig. 2 (MGM, 2008) The MGM Grand - visible horizon from the corner of Las Vegas Blvd and Flamingo RdFig 3 (MGM, 2008) The MGM Grand Fire - looking toward North-East from I-15According to the fire department fire broke out due to an galvanising problem in a combustible covered space next to a pie case in the restaurant. Presence of combustible interior finish and other material like plywood, plastic, paper, wooden decorative members and foam plast ic hyperbolise of chairs and booths in the Deli helped fire spread very quickly and reach an mutinous magnitude. There was no protection in the path for the fire to spread to the Casino. Combustible interior finish, furnishings, other wooden and plastic materials like foam padding and moldings present in the Casino put in more fuel in the fire. Flow of air was also enough for the fire to inflate (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Within 15 minutes of its detection fire had swallowed up a huge area including the Deli, the Casino and porte cocher on the west end of the building. rut and smoke rising to the upper floors notified guests of the problem on the ground floors. Helicopters, fire fighters, construction workers and passersby were able to save many hoi polloi. People who tried their way out through roofs and other exits were rescued while others waited in their rooms for help. Hotel was evacuated completely in 4 hours. 84 people died in the tragic incident. 14 pe ople died on the Casino level, 29 in rooms, 21 in